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Abstract
Bayes logics based on Bayes conditionalization as a probability updating mechanism have
recently been introduced in [2]. It has been shown that the modal logic of Bayesian belief
revision determined by probabilities on a finite set of elementary propositions or on a standard
Borel space is not finitely axiomatizable [2, 5]. Apart from Bayes conditionalization there are
other methods, extensions of the standard one, of updating a probability measure. One
such important method is Jeffrey’s conditionalization. In this paper we consider the modal
logic JL<ω of probability updating based on Jeffrey’s conditionalization where the underlying
measurable space is finite. By relating this logic to the logic of absolute continuity and to
Medvedev’s logic of finite problems, we show that JL<ω is not finitely axiomatizable. The
result is significant because it indicates that axiomatic approaches to belief revision might be
severely limited.
Keywords: Bayesian inference, Bayes learning, Bayes logic, Medvedev frames, Jeffrey con-
ditionalization, Jeffrey logic, Non finite axiomatizability.
1 Introduction and overview
In this paper we continue the investigations initiated in the recent paper [2] concerning logics
of probabilistic updating. [2] introduced Bayes logics to study the modal logical properties of
statistical inference based on Bayes conditionalization. The core idea was to look at Bayes condi-
tionalization as a relation between probability measures: the probability measure q can be Bayes-
accessed from the probability measure p if for some evidence (event) A we have q(·) = p(· | A).
Equivalently, we say in this situation that “q can be Bayes-learned from p”. That “it is possible to
obtain/learn q from p” is clearly a modal talk and calls for a logical modeling in terms of concepts
of modal logic. This logical modeling has been done in [2] and that paper also hints that a similar
analysis could be carried out when Bayes accessibility is replaced by the more general accessibility
based on Jeffrey conditionalization. Indeed, Bayesian belief revision is just a particular type of
belief revision: Various rules replacing the Bayes’s rule have been considered in the context of
belief change, one particular type is Jeffrey conditionalization (see [7] and [4]). Suppose {Ei}i<n
is a finite partition of X with p(Ei) 6= 0 and we are given a probability measure r : A → [0, 1],
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called the uncertain evidence, on the subalgebra A of B generated by this partition. Given a prior
probability p using the evidence r we infer to the measure q below by the “Jeffrey rule”:
q(H) =
∑
i<n
p(H | Ei)r(Ei) (1)
Let 〈X,B〉 be a measurable space and denote by M(X,B) the set of all probability measures
over 〈X,B〉. Bayes accessibility relation has been defined in [2] as follows: For v, w ∈M(X,B) we
say that w is Bayes accessible from v if there is an A ∈ B such that w(·) = v( · | A). We denote
the Bayes accessibility relation on M(X,B) by R(X,B). The notion of Bayes frames and Bayes
logics have been introduced in [2] as follows.
Definition 1.1 (Bayes frames). A Bayes frame is a Kripke frame 〈W,R〉 that is isomorphic, as a
directed graph, to F(X,B) = 〈M(X,B), R(X,B)〉 for a measurable space 〈X,B〉. 
Definition 1.2 (Bayes logics). A family of normal modal logics have been defined in [2] based on
finite or countable or countably infinite or all Bayes frames as follows.
BL<ω = {φ : (∀n ∈ N)F(n, ℘(n))  φ} (2)
BLω = {φ : F(ω, ℘(ω))  φ} (3)
BL≤ω = BL<ω ∩BLω (4)
BLst = {φ : (∀Standard Borel 〈X,B〉) F(X,B)  φ} (5)
BL = {φ : (∀ Bayes frames F) F  φ} (6)
We call BL<ω (resp. BL≤ω) the logic of finite (resp. countable) Bayes frames; however, observe
that the set of possible worlds M(X,B) of a Bayes frame F(X,B) is finite if and only if X is a
one-element set, otherwise it is at least of cardinality continuum. BLst is called the Standard
Bayes logic. 
Bayes logics in Definition 1.2 capture the laws of Bayesian learning: BL<ω is the set of general
laws of Bayesian learning based on all finite Bayes frames, while the general laws of Bayesian
learning independent of the particular representation 〈X,B〉 of the events is then the modal logic
BL. The following theorem has been proved in [2, 5]1.
Theorem 1.3. S4 ⊆ BL ⊆ BLst ⊆ S4.1 ( BLω = BL≤ω ( S4.1 + Grz ( BL<ω.
The finite Bayes frame case has been completely described in [2] and, in particular, it has been
shown that BL<ω has the finite frame property and is not finitely axiomatizable (see Propositions
5.8, 5.9 in [2]). The standard case had been discussed in [5] it has been shown that BLst is not
finitely axiomatizable.
Given two measures p, q ∈M(X,B) one can define Jeffrey accessibility: q is Jeffrey accessible
from p if there is a partition {Ei}i<n and uncertain evidence r such that eq. (1) holds. Denote
the corresponding accessibility relation by J(X,B).
1Basic terminology of modal logic, such as what S4 is, is recalled at the end of the introduction.
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Definition 1.4 (Jeffrey frames). A Jeffrey frame is a Kripke frame 〈W,R〉 that is isomorphic, as
a directed graph, to J (X,B) = 〈M(X,B), J(X,B)〉 for a measurable space 〈X,B〉. 
To capture the laws of Jeffrey learning we define the following normal modal logics.
Definition 1.5 (Jeffrey logics). We define a family of normal modal logics based on finite or
countable or countably infinite or all Jeffrey frames as follows.
JLn = {φ : J (n, ℘(n))  φ} (7)
JL<ω = {φ : (∀n ∈ N)J (n, ℘(n))  φ} (8)
JLω = {φ : J (ω, ℘(ω))  φ} (9)
JL≤ω = JL<ω ∩ JLω (10)
JLst = {φ : (∀Standard Borel 〈X,B〉) J (X,B)  φ} (11)
JL = {φ : (∀ Jeffrey frames J ) J  φ} (12)
We call JL<ω (resp. JL≤ω) the logic of finite (resp. countable) Jeffrey frames; however, observe
that the set of possible worlds M(X,B) of a Jeffrey frame J (X,B) is finite if and only if X is
a one-element set, otherwise it is at least of cardinality continuum. JLst is called the Standard
Jeffrey logic. 
Our aim in this paper is to take the first steps in studying finite Jeffrey logic. In particular, we
will prove that finite Jeffrey logic JL<ω is not finitely axiomatizable (Theorem 3.7). To gain such
a result we follow the method presented in Shehtman [6] and we relate Jeffrey logic to Medvedev’s
logic of finite problems. (The necessary definitions and results will be recalled later on; for an
overview about Medvedev’s logic we refer to the book [3] and to Shehtman [6]).
Structure of the paper. In the remaining part of the introduction we recall useful facts from
modal logic that we will make use of many times. In Section 2 it is shown that Jeffrey-accessibility
and the accessibility based on absolute continuity coincide, provided the underlying measurable
space is finite. Theorem 2.8 clarifies the containment relation between the logics of absolute
continuity: the different logics are all comparable, and the larger the cardinality of X, the smaller
the logic. The standard modal logical features of the Jeffrey logics are also determined in section
2. Section 3 is devoted to prove that the finite Jeffrey logic JL<ω is not finitely axiomatizable.
Finally, in section 4 we close with some open problems.
Useful preliminaries. By a frame we always understand a Kripke frame, that is, a structure of
the form F = 〈W,R〉, where W is a non-empty set (of possible worlds) and R ⊆W ×W a binary
relation (accessibility). Kripke models are tuples M = 〈W,R, [| · |]〉 based on frames F = 〈W,R〉,
and [| · |] : Φ→ ℘(W ) is an evaluation of propositional letters. Truth of a formula ϕ at world w is
defined in the usual way by induction:
• M, w  p ⇐⇒ w ∈ [| p |] for propositional letters p ∈ Φ.
• M, w  ϕ ∧ ψ ⇐⇒ M, w  ϕ AND M, w  ψ.
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• M, w  ¬ϕ ⇐⇒ M, w 6 ϕ.
• M, w  ♦ϕ ⇐⇒ there is v such that wRv and M, v  ϕ.
Formula ϕ is valid over a frame F (F  ϕ in symbols) if and only if it is true at every point in
every model based on the frame. For a class C of frames the modal logic of C is the set of all
modal formulas that are valid on every frame in C:
Λ(C) =
{
φ : (∀F ∈ C) F  φ} (13)
Λ(C) is always a normal modal logic. Let us recall the most standard list of modal axioms (frame
properties) that are often considered in the literature (cf. [1] and [3]).
Basic frame properties
Name Formula Corresponding frame property
T φ→ φ accessibility relation R is reflexive
4 φ→ φ accessibility relation R is transitive
M ♦φ→ ♦φ 2nd order property not to be covered here
Grz ((φ→ φ)→ φ)→ φ T + 4 + ¬∃P (∀w ∈ P )(∃v wRv)(v 6= w ∧ P (v))
S4 T + 4 preorder
S4.1 T + 4 + M preorder having endpoints
For two frames F = 〈W,R〉 and G = 〈W ′, R′〉 we write FEG if F is (isomorphic as a frame to) a
generated subframe of G. We recall that if FEG, then G  φ implies F  φ, whence Λ(G) ⊆ Λ(F)
(see Theorem 3.14 in [1]). If w ∈W , then we write Fw to denote the subframe of F generated by
w, and we call such subframes point-generated subframes. Further, let F  G denote a surjective,
bounded morphism (sometimes called p-morphisms). Such morphisms preserve the accessibility
relation and have the zig-zag property (see [1]). Recall that if F  G, then F  φ implies G  φ,
hence Λ(F) ⊆ Λ(G) (see Theorem 3.14 in [1]).
2 The modal logic of absolute continuity
Recall that for p, q ∈M(X,B) we say that q is absolutely continuous with respect to p (q  p in
symbols) if p(A) = 0 implies q(A) = 0 for all A ∈ B. Let now assume that X = {x0, . . . , xn−1} is
finite (and hence B = ℘(X)) and take any p ∈ M(X,℘(X)). If q ∈ M(X,℘(X)) is a probability
measure such that q  p, then by taking the partition Ei = {xi} for i < n and the probability
r(Ei) = q(Ei), we get
q(H) =
∑
i<n
p(H | Ei)r(Ei) (14)
This means that given any prior probability p and an other probability q that is absolutely con-
tinuous with respect to p, if the probability space is finite, then q can be obtained from p by the
Jeffrey rule. In other words, absolute continuity and Jeffrey accessibility coincide in the finite
case. This motivates us to introduce Kripke frames where the accessibility relation is defined by
absolute continuity, as follows.
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Definition 2.1. For a probability space 〈X,B〉 we define the Kripke frame
A(X,B) = 〈M(X,B),  〉 (15)
where  stands for absolute continuity: For probability measures p, q ∈M(X,B) we write p q
(or q  p) if p(A) = 0 implies q(A) = 0 for all A ∈ B. 
For a finite, or countably infinite set X we write A(X) in place of A(X,℘(X)).
Definition 2.2 (Logics of Absolute Continuity). In a similar manner to Definitions 1.2 and 1.5
we define a family of normal modal logics based on absolute continuity. Let κ be a cardinal and
n ∈ {=, <,≤}.
ACLnκ = {φ : (for all 〈X,B〉 with |X|n κ) A(X,B)  φ} (16)
ACLst = {φ : (∀ standard Borel 〈X,B〉) A(X,B)  φ} (17)
ACL = {φ : (∀〈X,B〉) A(X,B)  φ} (18)

Observe that the set of possible worlds M(X,B) of a frame A(X,B) is finite if and only if X
is a one-element set. What does the frame A(X) look like? Suppose X is a countable set. Then
for p, q ∈M(X,℘(X)) we have
p q ⇐⇒ supp(p) ⊇ supp(q) (19)
where supp(p) = {x ∈ X : p({x}) 6= 0}. Therefore, probability measures having the same support
are all accessible from each other.
Proposition 2.3. JLn = ACLn and JL<ω = ACL<ω for any n ∈ N.
Proof. We remarked at the beginning of this section that for a finite X, a probability q ∈
M(X,℘(X)) can be obtained from p ∈ M(X,℘(X)) by means of Jeffrey conditionalizing if and
only if p  q. This implies that the frames A(X) and J (X) are identical. Consequently
ACLn = Λ(A(n)) = Λ(J (n)) = JLn, and ACL<ω =
⋂
n ACLn =
⋂
n JLn = JL<ω.
Next we recall the notion of Medvedev frames and Medvedev logic from [6].
Definition 2.4. For a non-empty set X we let P0 = 〈℘(X)r{∅},⊇〉. P0(X) is called a Medvedev
frame. For a cardinality κ and n ∈ {=, <,≤} we define
MLnκ =
{
φ : (for all |X|n κ) P0(X)  φ} (20)
MLnκ is called the Medvedev logic based on sets |X|n κ. 
P0(X) can be visualized as a Boolean algebra with the least element ∅ cut out. Figure 2 shows
P0({1, 2, 3}). For a finite X, the frame A(X) can be obtained by blowing up each possible world
A ∈ ℘(X)− {∅} of P0(X) into the continuum sized complete graph having probability measures
p with supp(p) = A as vertices; except for the singleton sets {x} ∈ ℘(X) − {∅}: there is a single
probability with support {x}, the Dirac measure δ{x}. The frame A({1, 2, 3}) is sketched in Figure
2.
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{1, 2, 3}
{1, 2} {1, 3} {2, 3}
{1} {2} {1} {3} {2} {3}
Figure 1: Medvedev frame P0({1, 2, 3}). Arrows indicating transitivity are not drawn. We stress
that the copies of the nodes {1}, {2} and {3} are identical, thus P0(X) is not a tree but rather a
Boolean algebra without the least element.
•
δ{1}
•
δ{2}
•
δ{1}
•
δ{3}
•
δ{2}
•
δ{3}
supp = {1, 2} supp = {1, 3} supp = {2, 3}
supp = {1, 2, 3}
Figure 2: The frame A({1, 2, 3}). Arrows inside the bubbles and arrows indicating transitivity are
not noted. We stress again that the copies of the nodes δ{1}, δ{2} and δ{3} are identical.
Lemma 2.5. For a countable X the mapping f : A(X) P0(X) defined by
f(p) = supp(p) (21)
is a surjective bounded morphism.
Proof. Surjectivity of f is straightforward. f is a homomorphism (preserves accessibility) because
for p, q ∈M(X,℘(X)) we have p q if and only if supp(p) ⊇ supp(q) (see (19)). To verify the zig-
zag property, suppose supp(p) ⊇ A. We need q ∈M(X,℘(X)) such that p q and supp(q) = A.
Finding such a q is easy, take for example the conditional probability q(·) = p(· | A).
Corollary 2.6. ACLnκ ⊆ MLnκ holds for n ∈ {=, <,≤} and κ countable.
Proof. Immediate from Lemma 2.5.
Corollary 2.7. JLn ⊆ MLn and JL<ω ⊆ ML<ω for all n ∈ N.
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Proof. Combine Corollary 2.6 and Proposition 2.3.
Theorem 2.8. The following containments hold.
S4 ⊆ ACL ( S4.1 ⊆ ACLω = ACL≤ω ⊆ ACL<ω ⊆ ACLn+k ⊆ ACLn.
Proof. From the very definition the following containments are straightforward:
ACL ⊆ ACL≤ω ⊆ ACL<ω ⊆ ACLn and ACL ⊆ ACL≤ω ⊆ ACLω (22)
Next we show ACLm ⊆ ACLn for m > n and ACLω ⊆ ACL<ω. The proof relies on the next
lemma. If 〈X,B〉 and 〈Y,S〉 are measurable spaces, then we say that 〈X,B〉 can be embedded into
〈Y,S〉 (〈X,B〉 ↪→ 〈Y,S〉 in symbols) if there is a surjective measurable function f : Y → X such
that f−1 : B → S is a σ-algebra homomorphism.
Lemma 2.9. If 〈X,B〉 ↪→ 〈Y,S〉, then A(Y,S) A(X,B)
Proof. Let f : Y → X be a surjective measurable function (f−1 : B → S is a σ-algebra
homomorphism). For a probability measure p ∈ M(Y,S) let us assign the probability measure
F (p) ∈M(X,B) defined by the equation
F (p)(A) = p
(
f−1(A)
)
(A ∈ B)
Then F : A(Y,S) A(X,B) is a surjective bounded morphism.
Now, for m > n we have A(m)  A(n) and A(N)  A(n). Hence, the containments
ACLm ⊆ ACLn for m > n and ACLω ⊆ ACL<ω follow. We also obtain ACLω = ACL≤ω as
ACL≤ω = ACLω ∩ACL<ω.
To see S4 ⊆ ACL note that absolute continuity is reflexive and transitive (but not antisym-
metric), so every frame A(X,B) = 〈M(X,B),〉 validates S4 = T + 4. If a frame validates S4,
then it validates M (and thus S4.1) if and only if the accessibility relation has endpoints in the
following sense:
∀w∃u(w  u ∧ ∀v(u v → u = v)) (23)
If X is countable, then the Dirac measures δ{x} for x ∈ X are endpoints, therefore S4.1 ⊆ ACL≤ω.
To see that M 6⊆ ACL it is enough to give an example for an A(X,B) in which there are paths
without endpoints. Consider the frame A = 〈M([0, 1],B),〉 where [0, 1] is the unit interval and
B is the Borel σ-algebra. Then, for the Lebesgue measure w we have
A 6|= ∃u(w  u ∧ ∀v(u v → u = v)) (24)
We note that none of the logics ACLn (for n > 1) validate the Grzegorczyk axiom Grz as
A(X) always contain a complete subgraph of cardinality continuum.
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3 The logic of finite Jeffrey frames is not finitely axiomati-
zable
The logic of finite Jeffrey frames JL<ω is proved to be equal to ACL<ω (see Proposition 2.3).
We aim at proving ACL<ω is not finitely axiomatizable. We show first that ACL<ω is a logic of
finite frames (thus it has the finite frame property).
For each k, n ∈ N we define the finite frame Ak(n) as follows. Take the frame A(n). For each
non-singleton set A ⊆ n the frame A(n) contains a complete subgraph of cardinality continuum
(measures p with support supp(p) = A). Replace this infinite complete graph with the complete
graph on k vertices and keep everything else fixed. A more precise definition is the following.
Definition 3.1. Let n, k > 0 be natural numbers. For each non-singleton set a ∈ ℘(n)−{∅} take
new distinct points [a]1, . . . , [a]k, and for each singleton a ∈ ℘(n) take [a]1 = · · · = [a]k to be a
single new point. The set of possible worlds of the frame Ak(n) is the set
Ak(n) =
{
[a]1, . . . , [a]k : a ∈ ℘(n)− {∅}
}
(25)
For two points [a]i, [b]j ∈ Ak(n) we define the accessibility relation → as
[a]i → [b]j if and only if a ⊇ b (26)

Figure 3 illustrates the frame A3(3) (arrows indicating transitivity are omitted).
[{1}] [{2}] [{1}] [{3}] [{2}] [{3}]
Figure 3: The frame A3(3). Arrows indicating transitivity are not drawn. We stress that vertices
[{1}], [{2}] and [{3}] at the bottom has been drawn twice though the copies are identical.
Lemma 3.2. For all n and k we have A(n) Ak(n).
Proof. For a measure p ∈ M(n) the support supp(p) is a non-empty subset of n, therefore
[supp(p)]1, . . ., [supp(p)]k are elements of Ak(n). Take any mapping f : M(n)→ Ak(n) such that
f(p) = [supp(p)]i for some i ∈ {1, . . . , k} (27)
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and f is a surjection. Such a mapping clearly exists as for each a ∈ ℘(n)− {∅} we have
|{p : supp(p) = a}| = 2ℵ0 > k (28)
We claim that f is a surjective bounded morphism:
Homomorphism. Take p, q ∈ M(n) and suppose f(p) = [supp(p)]i, f(q) = [supp(q)]j . Then
p q if and only if supp(p) ⊇ supp(q) if and only if [supp(p)]i → [supp(q)]j .
Zag property. Assume f(p) → [a]i for some a ∈ ℘(n) − {∅}. This can be the case if and only
if supp(p) ⊇ a. By surjectivity of f there is q such that f(q) = [a]i, whence supp(p) ⊇ supp(q)
which means p q.
Lemma 3.3. For each modal formula ϕ there is k ∈ N such that A(n) 1 ϕ implies Ak(n) 1 ϕ.
Proof. We prove that if ϕ uses the propositional letters p1, . . . , pk only, then A(n) 1 ϕ implies
A2k(n) 1 ϕ. If A(n) 1 ϕ, then there is an evaluation V such that the model 〈A(n), V 〉 1 ϕ.
The truth of a formula in a model depends only on the evaluation of the propositional letters the
formula uses, therefore we may assume that V is restricted to p1, . . ., pk.
For x ∈ A(n) we define a 0–1 sequence of length k according to whether x ∈ V (pi) holds for
1 ≤ i ≤ k:
Px(i) =
{
1 if x ∈ V (pi)
0 otherwise.
(1 ≤ i ≤ k) (29)
As there are 2k different 0–1 sequences of length k, the number of possible Px’s is at most 2
k.
Take any surjective mapping f : A(n)→ A2k(n) such that
f(x) = [supp(x)]i for some i ∈ {1, . . . , k} (30)
and for x, y ∈ A(n) with supp(x) = supp(y) we have
Px = Py implies f(x) = f(y) (31)
Such a mapping f must exist as for each non-singleton a ∈ ℘(n)− {∅} we have 2k elements [a]1,
. . ., [a]2k in A2k(n), and this is the number of the possible Px’s. Let us now define the evaluation
V ′ over A2k(n) by
V ′(pi) = {f(x) : x ∈ V (pi)} (32)
for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Condition (31) ensures that if x and y agree on p1, . . . , pk, then so do the images
f(x) and f(y). Thus, V ′ is well-defined. Following the proof of 3.2 one obtains that
f : 〈A(n), V 〉  〈A2k(n), V ′〉 (33)
is a surjective bounded morphism. As 〈A(n), V 〉  ¬ϕ we arrive at 〈A2k(n), V ′〉  ¬ϕ. This
means A2k(n) 1 ϕ.
Proposition 3.4. ACL<ω =
⋂∞
n=1
⋂∞
k=1 Λ (Ak(n)).
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Proof. By combining Lemmas 3.2 and 3.3 the equality
∞⋂
n=1
Λ (A(n)) =
∞⋂
n=1
∞⋂
k=1
Λ (Ak(n)) (34)
follows immediately. The right-hand side of the equation is the definition of ACL<ω.
Let us recall a theorem of Jankov and de Jongh
Lemma 3.5 (cf. Proposition 4 in [6]). Let F be a point-generated finite S4-frame. Then there
is a modal formula χ(F) with the following properties:
(A) For any S4-frame G we have G 1 χ(F) if and only if ∃u Gu  F .
(B) For any logic L ⊇ S4 we have L ⊆ Λ(F) if and only if χ(F) /∈ L.
Corollary 3.6. Let K be a class of finite, transitive frames, closed under point-generated sub-
frames. For every finite, transitive, point-generated frame F we have
F  Λ(K) if and only if ∃(G ∈ K) G  F .
Proof. (⇐) If there is G ∈ K such that G  F , then Λ(K) ⊆ Λ(G) ⊆ Λ(F).
(⇒) By way of contradiction suppose G 6 F for all G ∈ K. Then by Lemma 3.5 we have
G  χ(F) for all G ∈ K, in particular, χ(F) ∈ Λ(K). It is straightforward to see that F 1 χ(F),
thus F 1 Λ(K).
Theorem 3.7. ACL<ω is not finitely axiomatizable.
Proof. A logic L is not finitely axiomatizable if and only if for any formula φ ∈ L there is a frame
Fφ such that Fφ 1 L but Fφ  φ.
We will use the proof that Medvedev’s modal logic of finite problems, ML<ω, is not finitely
axiomatizable. We refer to [6] where it has been proved that for each modal formula φ ∈ML<ω
there is a finite, transitive, point-generated frame Gφ such that Gφ  φ while Gφ 1 ML<ω. The
construction therein is such that Gφ, as a graph, has no directed cycles apart from the loops.
We intend to show that Gφ 1 ACL<ω. This is enough because ACL<ω ⊂ML<ω. By Proposi-
tion 3.4 ACL<ω is the logic of the class K = {Ak(n) : n, k ∈ N} of finite, transitive frames, closed
under point-generated subframes. Therefore, to show Gφ 1 ACL<ω, by Corollary 3.6 it is enough
to prove that Gφ is not a bounded morphic image of any Ak(n). Suppose, seeking a contradiction,
that there exists a bounded morphism f : Ak(n) Gφ. Then for each a ∈ ℘(n)−{∅} the elements
[a]1, . . ., [a]k should be mapped into the same point xa in Gφ. This is because the points [a]i
are all accessible from each other, while in Gφ there are no non-singleton sets in which points are
mutually accessible. It follows that f induces a bounded morphism f∗ : P0(n) → Gφ from the
Medvedev frame P0(n) into Gφ by letting f∗(a) = xa for a ∈ ℘(n) − {∅}. But this is impossible
as Gφ 1 ML<ω.
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4 Closing words and open problems
The recent paper [2] introduced Bayes logics based on Bayes conditionalization as a probability
updating mechanism. Apart from Bayes conditionalization there are other methods, extensions of
the standard one, of updating a probability measure. Jeffrey’s conditionalization might be among
the most important and well studied ones. In this paper we considered the modal logic of updating
based on Jeffrey’s conditionalization where the underlying measurable space is finite. We have seen
that in such a case Jeffrey’s conditionalization and the accessibility based on absolute continuity
give the same class of Kripke frames and logics: JL<ω = ACL<ω (Proposition 2.3). This logic can
be related to the well-known Medvedev logic of finite problems ML<ω, in fact JL<ω ⊆ ML<ω
(Corollary 2.7).
It has been shown in [2] that BL<ω has the finite frame property and is not finitely axiom-
atizable (see Propositions 5.8, 5.9 in [2]), and not finite axiomatizability of the standard Bayes
logic BLst has been proved in [5]. These results are clearly significant because they indicate that
axiomatic approaches to belief revision might be severely limited. In this paper we proved that
non finite axiomatizability is not a feature of just Bayes-learning: by Theorem 3.7 finite Jeffrey
logic JL<ω is not finitely axiomatizable (and has the finite frame property). This result puts a
further limit to axiomatic approaches to belief revision.
We do not yet have results about the infinite case. Proposition 2.3 cannot directly be extended
to infinite measurable spaces, thus there is no straightforward proof of JLω = ACLω, for example.
Note that in equation (1) we relied on a finite partition. One might define Jeffrey conditionalization
allowing countable partitions in a similar manner: Given a prior probability p and a countable
partition {Ei}i∈N of X with p(Ei) 6= 0 we can infer to the probability measure q if the following
equation hold:
q(H) =
∑
i∈N
p(H | Ei)q(Ei) (35)
Let us call this updating infinite Jeffrey’s conditionalization. It is easy to see that absolute conti-
nuity and accessibility based on infinite Jeffrey’s conditionalization coincide even in the countably
infinite case. (However, not in general). We close the paper with some open problems.
Problem 4.1. What the exact relations between Bayes and Jeffrey logics are?
Problem 4.2. Is JLω, JLst or JL finitely axiomatizable? What about ACLω, ACLst or ACL?
Does it make a difference if we allow infinite Jeffrey conditionalization?
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